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Into the second decade of the 21 st Century, some countries still struggle with recurrent conflicts that threaten development efforts and national cohesion despite democratic advances. This case study is focused on Mali, a democratic western African State in the Sahel region, and its recurring insurgencies coupled with permanent insecurity in its northern regions. It presents a prime example of the epidemic levels of insecurity and instability faced by many African nations.
For many years, but especially since 2000, Mali has been the site of violent activity originating from "North" Mali that is destabilizing for both the country and its regional neighbors. In this paper, North Mali represents the three northern desert administrative regions of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao that are mainly populated with Arabs, Tuaregs (fair skin), Songhais, and Fulanis. It is also the lightly governed region which serves as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). "South" Mali includes the rest of the country, populated mainly by darker skinned groups. This is an important point, that Mali equals "North" and "South", so there is no part of Mali not discussed. The root causes of insecurity and instability cannot be viewed simply in ethnic terms between the North and South. It includes the relationship between the desire of unsaid self determination, the lack of economic opportunities and poverty in the North coupled with feelings of marginalization and social grievances stemming from the Tuareg self-perception of superiority to Southern black rule and pre-colonial history. Responding to them requires regional cooperation. Some of these combatants back the existing Tuareg separatist movements.
Historically, Mali's approach to these crises has been to deal with them bilaterally including the Algerian diplomatic effort; but having failed to make progress, it became clear that a regional approach was the only way. In 2009, the central government The Islamic beliefs of his successor Kankan Moussa deepened trades ties among the religious cities of Timbuktu, Gao and, Djéné with North Africa. 10 These movements of population were made possible by the trans-Saharan commerce routes which linked
North Africa to the Sub-Sahara region.
As legitimate commerce grew, various illegal and violent activities grew with it.
Caravans changed their ancient routes due to the insecurity along the Trans Saharan routes. 11 The Trans Saharan commerce routes were subject to the effects of "Razzia" carried out by horsemen who seized commercial convoys and caravans. Razzia is described as a form of limited warfare based on raiding and looting, and is one many terms used (ghazi being another). It was not purely random but conducted against one's rival caravans, which directly explains Tuareg behavior today. 12 Movements across the Sahara became dangerous for the traders who ventured on the route due to Razzia.
Also, northern regions of Mali have been subject to various insurgencies during the rule of the Songhai Empire in the 14 th and 15 th centuries. Velton argues that "the most rebellious part of the Mali Empire was in the Sahelian and desert regions." "vulnerable to climate change, the absence of rainfall and the growing humanitarian concern about drought in the contemporary period." 16 The region represents the largest portion of Mali, with 60% of the total size of the country, but also the poorest. The inability of the people to sustain themselves has resulted in large migrations into neighboring countries, mainly Algeria and Libya, or joining criminal groups to survive.
According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the lack of development in North Mali is one of the main causes of social instability in the region. In September 2006, Al-Qaeda declared officially the inclusion of the GSPC into its network which was confirmed by its renaming into AQIM in January 2007. 26 Following the successful operations of the Algerian security forces against its members, AQIM failed to expand its operations in Morocco and Tunisia. The organization was able to "exploit the security vacuum in the Algerian Sahara and the Sahel region, from where it has managed to establish a significant presence in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger." 27 According to Louis Caprioli, the former head of French counter-terrorism, the goal of AQIM is the liberation of the Islamic lands and the end of plundering by the Western countries.
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The central location of AQIM activities is in North Mali. 29 AQIM kidnappings are primarily conducted against tourists and NGO workers. 30 Northern region inhabitants depend too much on international aid and investments through development projects to provide for their basic needs. The lack of security for workers raises concerns about the probable withdrawal of some NGOs, and for the hesitation of others to get involved in the region. In 1998 in the Gao region of Mali, the French NGO Action contre la Faim, withdrew for a while following an attack on one of its members by armed bandits. 31 AQIM's attacks and presence has threatened tourism, a vital economic activity.
Once a popular tourist destination, Mali's tourism rates have dropped out of fear of kidnapping. 32 The region of Timbuktu has been hardest hit and the economic impact has been large job loss.
On the social sphere, AQIM is building "outstanding community relations with local populations and can be locally popular as it often has its own social welfare programme." 33 Taking advantages of the lack of governmental control, AQIM is integrating communities and developing social relationships with local populations that once practiced peaceful Islam. This strategy aims to "advance its long term strength and viability…to gradually deepen its roots, grow its resources, and develop its operational strength." 34 One of the most effective ways used to develop strong social ties with the communities is marriage with locals.
AQIM is also reinvesting ransom from kidnapping in the region and generating income and job opportunities for communities and individuals by its illegal activities. 35 The objective is to gain the hearts and minds of the local population and is a long term strategy.
Their success risks the transfer of Islamic extremism to the region. The connection between the MNLA, AQIM and the Islamic movement, led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former Tuareg rebel leader, is a sign of the radicalization of the insurgency. 36 Iyad Ag
Ghali, the undisputed leader of Tuareg rebel movement in 1990 is inspired by the Islamic group "Ansar Eddine" and his willingness for an Islamic state in the desert.
Ineffective Malian Response
Since independence in 1960, policies toward the region are characterized by procrastination. During the ten years of the Konaré's regime, cash-based corruption has been the main policy adopted to manage the Tuareg rebel leaders. Also, the designation of the managers of development projects in the region was influenced by the same Tuareg leaders. In the meantime, the development gap between the north and south region has grown. The region, which represents 3/4 of the country's total size, has less than one percent of upgraded road and other supporting infrastructures. Ignorant to deal with the growing threat and improve the security situation.
Influence of External Actors
The withdrawal of the Malian military from some security positions in the region followed the signing of the National Pact of Reconciliation in 1992. This along with porous national borders has contributed to the influx of criminal trafficking in the region.
''Most of the products that are trafficked in the north are produced and consumed outside Mali." 37 In addition to the AQIM threat, these criminals contribute to the increased presence of small arms, illicit drugs, rebel groups, and bandits.
Many experts believe "that the weapons traffic and circulation in northern Mali can be traced to the presence of armed conflicts in the sub region, including not only Algeria, but also Chad, Libya, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, and Cote d'Ivoire." 38 Other external actors include the Polisario, the armed branch of West Sahara independence movement from, which some of the Tuareg insurgents received assistance. 39 In Because the security threats are transnational, regional military solutions should be pursued. "The Sahel states relied primarily on regional co-operation to stave off security threats" stressed the Malian president during his visit to Algeria on October 27 th , 2011. 52 States in the region lack resources to control their vast semi-arid or desert territories. Some analysts argue that Sahel states cannot go it alone in their counterterror efforts. 53 Military analyst Sheikh Tourad Ould Eli, argues that Mali has vast desert areas in its northern regions and it is difficult for the country with scarce resources to control those areas. 54 The future of the region requires a "comprehensive security and development approach to respond to the complexity of the challenges." There is no guarantee that this program will be successful and achieve the 
